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The concept of microaggressions 
gained prominence with the publication of 
Sue et al.’s 2007, “Racial Microaggressions 
in Everyday Life,” which defined 
microaggressions as communicative, 
somatic, environmental or relational cues 
that demean and/or disempower members of 
minority groups in virtue of their minority 
status.1 Microaggressions, they asserted, are 
typically subtle and ambiguous. Often, they 
are inadvertent or altogether unconscious. 
For these reasons, they are also far more 
pervasive than other, more overt, forms of 
bigotry (which are less-tolerated in 
contemporary America). The authors 
propose a tripartite taxonomy of 
microaggressions: 
• Microassaults involve explicit and 
intentional racial derogation; 
• Microinsults involve rudeness or 
insensitivity towards another’s 
heritage or identity; 
• Microinvalidations occur when the 
thoughts and feelings of a minority 
group member seem to be excluded, 
negated or nullified as a result of 
their minority status. 
Sue et al. go on to present anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that repeated exposure 
to microaggressions is detrimental to the 
well-being of minorities. Moreover, they 
assert, a lack of awareness about the 
prevalence and impact of microaggressions 
among mental health professionals could 
undermine the practice of clinical 
psychology—reducing the quality and 
accessibility of care for those who may need 
it most. 
Towards the conclusion, however, 
the authors acknowledge the “nascent” state 
of research on microaggressions and call for 
further investigation. They emphasize that 
future studies should focus first and 
foremost on empirically substantiating the 
harm caused by microaggressions, and 
documenting how people cope (or fail to 
cope) with experiencing them. They suggest 
further research should also probe whether 
or not there is systematic variation as to who 
incurs microaggressions, which type or 
types of microaggressions particular 
populations tend to endure, how harmful 
microaggressions are to different groups, 
and in which contexts microaggressions tend 
to be more (or less) prevalent or harmful. 
Finally, the authors recommend expanding 
microaggression research to include 
incidents against gender and sexual 
minorities, and those with disabilities. 
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The State of Microaggression Research Today 
In the decade following Sue et al.’s 
landmark paper, there have been extensive 
discussions about microaggressions—among 
practitioners, in the academic literature, and 
increasingly, in popular media outlets and 
public forums. But unfortunately, very little 
empirical research has been conducted to 
actually substantiate the ubiquity of 
microaggressions, to systematically catalog 
the harm they cause, or to refine the authors’ 
initial taxonomy. 
In “Microaggressions: Strong 
Claims, Inadequate Evidence,” Scott 
Lilienfeld highlights five core premises 
undergirding the microaggression research 
program (MRP):2 
1. Microaggressions are operationalized 
with sufficient clarity and consensus 
to afford rigorous scientific 
investigation. 
2. Microaggressions are interpreted 
negatively by most or all minority 
group members. 
3. Microaggressions reflect implicitly 
prejudicial and implicitly aggressive 
motives. 
4. Microaggressions can be validly 
assessed using only respondents’ 
subjective reports. 
5. Microaggression exert an adverse 
impact on recipient’s mental health. 
His comprehensive meta-analysis suggests 
that there is “negligible” support for these 
axioms—individually or (especially) 
collectively. 
 
However, Lilienfeld emphasizes, an 
absence of evidence regarding the 
prevalence and harm of microaggressions 
should not be interpreted as evidence of 
absence. Over the course of the essay he 
repeatedly asserts that it is “undeniable” that 
minorities regularly experience slights 
which could be construed as 
microaggressions; he acknowledges that 
these incidents are likely often deeply 
unpleasant or unsettling for affected 
minorities, and likely harmful in aggregate. 
Nonetheless, important research questions 
remain, namely: how harmful are 
microaggressions, for whom, in what ways 
and under what circumstances? 
These are not just a matters of 
intellectual curiosity, but instead, 
prerequisites for crafting effective 
responses, evaluating attempted 
interventions, and minimizing iatrogenesis3 
along the way. It is similarly critical to 
clarify and substantiate claims about 
microaggressions for the sake of blunting 
skepticism and resistance—particularly from 
those whose identity, perceived interests and 
routines are most likely to be challenged by 
reforms in social norms, practices and 
policies (i.e. those who are white, native-
born, heterosexual, able in body and mind, 
economically-comfortable and/or men). 
Finally, it is essential to the continued 
integrity and credibility of social research 
that basic evidentiary standards be met—
especially for strong psychological claims— 
particularly in light of how prominent and 
politicized the issue of microaggressions has 
become. In other words, it is in everyone’s 
interest to address the profound conceptual 
and evidentiary shortcomings of the MRP 
literature to date. 
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Evidentiary Gaps 
According to Lilienfeld, one of the 
most striking aspects of microaggression 
research is that over the course of nearly ten 
years, the literature has hardly advanced 
beyond the taxonomy and methods laid out 
in the original paper.  
For instance, with regards to 
demonstrating the harm caused by 
microaggressions, there has been very little 
engagement with contemporary cognitive or 
behavioral research—and virtually no 
experimental testing. Instead, advocates 
have relied almost exclusively on small 
collections of anecdotal testimonies, from 
samples that are neither randomized nor 
established as representative of any 
particular population. This is problematic, 
Lilienfeld asserts, because the 
preponderance of contemporary social 
psychological research strongly suggests 
that the perception of, and response to, 
microaggressions would vary a great deal 
between and within minority populations as 
a result of individuals’ particular situational, 
cognitive, psychological, cultural, and 
personality traits.4  
It is important to account for these 
factors in order to isolate and better measure 
the potential harm caused by 
microaggressions. Identifying the impact of 
particular traits on microaggression response 
could also help researchers determine who is 
most sensitive to perceiving 
microaggressions, and who is most 
adversely affected by them—allowing for 
tailored interventions to better assist those 
who are particularly vulnerable.  
 
Meanwhile, collecting information on the 
base-rate prevalence of microaggressions 
(relative to particular institutions or 
circumstances) can help researchers identify 
exemplary environments where these 
incidents seem relatively rare, as well as 
environments which seem especially toxic. 
This can help prioritize interventions and 
provide models for reform. This information 
is also essential for evaluating whether 
particular interventions seem to be 
increasing, decreasing or failing to impact 
the prevalence of microaggressions (without 
a base-line, it is impossible to measure 
progress)…not to mention determining how 
bad the problem is to begin with. 
  Conceptual Problems 
Beyond the evidentiary gaps, 
Lilienfeld asserts that one of the biggest 
problems with microaggression literature is 
the lack of clarity on exactly what 
constitutes a microaggression, what does 
not, and in virtue of what. As things 
currently stand, the microaggression concept 
is so inclusive that even those committed to 
doing the “right thing” often find themselves 
in impossible situations. Consider the 
following example:  
A white teacher puts forward a 
question the class. A number of students 
raise their hands to answer—including some 
minority students. According to the 
literature, if the teacher fails to call on the 
minority student(s), this could be interpreted 
as a microaggression by favoring the 
dominant perspectives at the expense of 
minorities. However, deciding to call on a 
minority student would merely create a new 
dilemma:  
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if the instructor criticizes or challenges any 
aspect of the student’s response, this could 
be construed as a microaggression as well: 
invalidating their perspective. On the other 
hand, if the teacher praises the student’s 
answer as insightful or articulate, this might 
also be considered a microaggression: why 
should it be remarkable or noteworthy that 
the minority student provided an apt 
response?  
That is, for those who are 
“privileged” (i.e. white, native-born, 
heterosexual, able in body and mind, 
economically-comfortable and/or a man), 
virtually anything one says or does could be 
construed as a microaggression.5 In such a 
climate it may seem desirable or even 
necessary for many to minimize interactions 
with those outside their identity group(s) in 
order to avoid needless (but otherwise 
seemingly inevitable) conflict.6 This is a 
major problem given that, according to Sue 
et al., the main purpose of the MRP is to 
foster broader and deeper openness, 
understanding, dialogue and cooperation. 
Lillenfeld suggests that the term 
“microaggression” causes further 
polarization: “Aggression” implies hostile 
intent. Yet microaggressions, as defined in 
the literature, tend to involve neither 
hostility nor intent. Most violations are 
microinsults and microinvalidations—which 
are typically unintentional slights resulting 
from ignorance, insensitivity or unconscious 
bias among people of good-will.  
 
 
 
 
By classifying such incidents as 
“aggressions,” those who commit these faux 
pas as “perpetrators,” and those who 
experience them as “victims” all parties 
involved become disposed towards 
responding to incidents in a confrontational 
rather than conciliatory fashion,7 as both 
sides feel unfairly maligned or mistreated.  
Lilienfeld suggests advocates would 
be better served by revising terms and 
concepts to better capture the indirect and 
typically inadvertent nature of the 
phenomena in question. Microassaults, he 
argues,  should probably be struck from the 
taxonomy altogether: the examples provided 
in the literature tend not to be “micro” at all, 
but outright assaults, intimidation, 
harassment and bigotry–even rising to the 
level of crimes in some instances. In contrast 
with microinvalidations or microinsults, 
microassaults are necessarily overt, 
intentional and hateful acts. Including these 
types of incidents as “microaggressions” is 
both unnecessary and confusing.8  
 Derald Wing Sue Responds 
In “Racial Microaggressions in 
Everyday Life” Sue and his collaborators 
acknowledged the need for further empirical 
research on microaggressions, and suggested 
avenues future work should prioritize. 
Lilienfeld has argued that these 
recommendations have gone largely 
unheeded, and as a result, many of the 
authors’ claims remain just as tenuous in 
2017 as they were in 2007.  
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In a rejoinder,9 entitled “Microaggressions 
and ‘Evidence’: Empirical or Experiential 
Reality?” Sue declines to contest 
Lilienfeld’s overall picture. In fact, he 
acknowledges that the critiques are 
generally valid—adding that he actually 
shares many of the concerns Lilienfeld 
raised about the contemporary state of 
microaggression research. 
Given this apparently broad 
agreement between Sue and Lilienfeld, most 
of the rest of the rejoinder proves 
perplexing. For instance, despite having 
called for further empirical research on 
multiple occasions himself, Sue claims 
(without support) that highlighting 
conceptual or evidentiary gaps in the MRP 
somehow undermines or negates the 
phenomenological significance of 
microaggressions. This assertion is 
particularly baffling given that Lilienfeld 
repeatedly calls for greater emphasis and 
attention to the subjective reality of 
microaggressions in the very paper Sue is 
responding to. 
More confusing is Dr. Sue’s 
insinuation that it may not be necessary to 
experimentally validate microaggressions at 
all. He argues, psychology, science and 
empiricism are not the only ways of 
understanding human experience--nor are 
they necessarily the best method(s) in every 
instance. Of course, one anticipates 
Lilienfeld would simply agree with this 
point—albeit while insisting that context 
also matters with regards to which tools or 
frameworks are most useful or important:  
 
 
In the 2007 essay and subsequent 
works, Dr. Sue was speaking as a 
psychologist, and relying on his credentials 
as a psychologist to publish and disseminate 
his work—often in journals related to the 
social and behavioral sciences or the clinical 
practice of psychology /psychiatry. 
Engaging in these capacities entails agreeing 
to the evidentiary, methodological and 
ethical norms or standards of one’s chosen 
profession or field. Lilienfeld was arguing 
that the current state of research on 
microaggressions seems to fall short in these 
regards—nothing more, nothing less. So 
there is a sense in which Sue’s response, 
evoking questions about the ultimate nature 
of truth or humanity, is more-or-less 
irrelevant to Lilienfeld’s arguments. It also 
seems deeply problematic for Sue to put 
forward microaggression research as 
scientific when this seems to lend credibility 
to his project, but then claim 
microaggressions need not be subject to 
empirical testing when faced with criticism. 
Ultimately, Sue responds directly to 
only one of Lilienfeld’s 18 
recommendations—namely that until 
microaggressions are better understood, we 
should be conservative in executing policies 
intended to address them. Sue 
condescendingly dismisses this suggestion, 
asserting that only “[t]hose in the majority 
group, those with power and privilege, and 
those who do not experience 
microaggressions are privileged to enjoy the 
luxury of waiting for proof.” 
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Such a reply is striking given the 
long and ignoble history of harm caused by 
hastily applied (and often later discredited) 
social and psychological research—with the 
costs borne primarily by women, people of 
color, the poor and other vulnerable 
populations.10 In other words, Lilienfeld’s 
advice should not be understood as an 
expression of privilege: guarding against 
iatrogenesis and adverse second order 
effects is important, including for 
minorities—in fact, on average these 
safeguards prove especially critical for 
minorities given their already more 
precarious socio-economic position.  
In this instance, it seems plausible 
that poorly conceived or implemented 
policies intended to address 
microaggressions could endanger the free 
exchange of ideas, lead to unjustly severe 
consequences for minor (even unintentional) 
infractions, heighten animus between 
minority and majority groups, or even 
exacerbate the harm caused by 
microaggressions (for instance by making 
already-vulnerable individuals even more 
sensitive to perceived slights or injustices).11 
In virtually any of these eventualities 
everyone—including minorities—may be 
worse off than before. This possibility seems 
to warrant more than a snarky retort about 
Lilienfeld’s supposed privilege.  
 
 
 
 
More reliable data on the prevalence 
and harm of microaggressions could help to 
avoid these negative externalities by 
enabling more nuanced policy responses 
from university administrators. Sue was 
correct in calling for this research in 2007, 
and Lillenfeld is correct in reaffirming that 
call ten years later. 
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